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Abstract 
he main problem of Russia’s EU policy is the lack of a strategic vision of Russia’s place 
in the pan-European context. The Moscow-declared ‘European choice’ has not been 
confirmed in either the foreign or domestic policies of the Russian Federation. 
Mechanisms of interaction with the EU are not fully developed. Russia’s EU policy lacks 
a strategic vector and sufficient bureaucratic support. 
The experts contributing to this Situation Analysis (see list of participants in the annex) warned 
that Russia may repeat its past mistakes if it replaces specific projects with loud declarations, in 
relation to which its partners may also demand unilateral concessions. 
The current scenario may take the form of an international legal ‘package’, consisting of 
agreements on four ‘common spaces’ between Russia and the EU. A majority of the experts 
warned Russia against hurrying to conclude formal agreements on these ‘spaces’, especially if 
these agreements do not concern strategic areas of cooperation but rather specific concessions.
* 
Instead, Russia should focus on the preparation of a new ‘major’ treaty with the EU to replace 
the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and on efforts to advance specific 
rapprochement projects. 
The experts concluded that there are no objective insurmountable obstacles to solving the issue 
of Russia’s formal accession to the European Union. The solution of this issue depends, above 
all, on the EU’s further evolution (towards a quasi-federative state or a ‘common market plus’ 
model) and on Russia’s choice of development model (a stagnating authoritarian state vs. a 
steadily developing democracy). 
Regardless of the scenario under which Russia-EU relations develop, Moscow must reinforce 
the ‘European’ component of its state machinery and launch a serious programme for improving 
Russians’ knowledge about the European Union and their practical interaction with it. 
 
                                                      
* Editor’s note: This report was concluded in early 2005, before the documents on foreign policy spaces 
were adopted at the EU-Russian summit of May 2005. Only the Preface that follows has been updated in 
this report. 
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Preface 
uring the Moscow summit of May 10
th, 2005, Russia and the European Union adopted 
joint Road Maps for the building of ‘four common spaces’. Formally, Russia and the 
EU had never before assumed such comprehensive commitments, especially in the 
economic sphere. The main objective of a Common Economic Space (CES), set by the parties, 
is “the creation of an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia”. 
As the main instrument for achieving this goal, the Road Maps provide for gradual 
harmonisation of Russia’s and the EU’s legislation and regulatory norms. These efforts must 
involve industrial and competition policies, government support for companies and foreign 
trade. As regards the Common Economic Space, the Road Maps repeatedly emphasise the need 
for building mechanisms for bilateral consultations among all interested parties, including 
business persons and civil society. At the same time, the Road Maps do not even mention the 
possibility of creating a free trade zone between Russia and the EU, nor bind the parties to 
accept some other norms.  
The summit’s results failed to give a clear answer to any of the issues raised at the workshop 
held by this group in January 2005. The Road Maps represent an attempt to replace a strategic 
vision of Russia-EU relations with technocratic plans and cooperation between their 
administrative machineries. The recent years have shown that even well thought-out 
technocratic decisions may fail if they do not rest on a long-term vision of the relations and if 
they are not supported by society. 
The Road Maps, which after a period of long negotiations appear as if they were a very ‘light’ 
version of preparation plans for Russia’s EU membership, largely resemble a list of good 
intentions. Politically, they have masked the crisis in Russia-EU relations but failed to solve 
their main problems. The approval of the Road Maps can take these relations out of the political 
context, markedly reduce public interest in this issue and bring about stagnation in relations 
between the parties. But if Moscow and Brussels display enough political will, which they 
presently lack, the Road Maps can lay the foundation for their long-term structured cooperation. 
Russia-EU relations may follow an undesirable scenario, where they would be transformed into 
administrative routine, and the decision-making would be made by ministries and other 
government agencies but would be not controlled by society. The leadership in the struggle for 
the right to fill in the details of the Road Maps with actual decisions would belong to those 
having greater administrative-bureaucratic resources. 
The European integration of the last 50 years provides solid arguments in favour of shifting the 
focus to cooperation in specific areas and projects. However, such a policy will be successful 
only if the parties have a clear, shared understanding of the strategic prospects of their mutual 
relations. Thus far, Russia and the European Union have not acquired such an understanding. 
Annexes to the present report in Russian can be found on the following websites: www.svop.ru, 
www.globalaffairs.ru, www.isoa.ru, and www.ieras.ru. 
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1. Introduction 
Relations with the European Union occupy a special place in the system of Russia’s 
international ties. The EU also plays an important role in people-to-people contacts of Russian 
citizens abroad. At the same time, the level of mutual understanding between the larger part of 
Russian and European elites has been very low over the last few years. Currently, Russia-EU 
relations are in a contradictory and even crisis state: serious political differences between the 
parties and their rivalry in the economic sphere combine with the so-called ‘strategic 
cooperation’ programme aimed at Russia’s acceptance of European rules and standards. 
What is the real scope of the interdependence and cooperation between Russia and the EU? 
What do the partners want from this cooperation? How may Russia-EU relations develop in the 
future? And which of possible cooperation models is the most advantageous to Russia? Can 
Russia join the EU in the future? 
To find answers to these questions, the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 
the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs, the Aeroflot Joint Stock Company, the Council 
on Foreign and Defence Policy and the Institute of Strategic Studies and Analysis organised a 
workshop entitled “Russia and the European Union: The Present Situation and Prospects”. The 
workshop was attended by distinguished Russian experts in Russia-EU relations, representatives 
of Russian ministries and agencies (the Presidential Administration, the Foreign Ministry, the 
Ministry for Economic Development and Trade, and the Ministry of Transport) and businesses. 
Along with discussion of the issues raised at the workshop, the experts answered questionnaires 
drawn up by the scenario group. 
The present report sums up the conclusions drawn by the participants in the workshop and 
shows their agreement or disagreement on the issues discussed. Besides, the report contains 
recommendations for Russian governmental institutions, made on the basis of the workshop 
discussions. The report also takes into account the results of the experts’ anonymous polling on 
major issues of Russia-EU relations. 
The present report consists of two main parts. The first part (General Analysis of the Situation) 
contains a brief discussion of the state of Russia-EU relations by the participants in the 
workshop. It focuses on major problems and sensitive issues of the present-day relations 
between the two parties. 
The second part of the report (Conclusions and Recommendations) provides main conclusions 
concerning key areas of Russia-EU relations. The recommendations comprise measures needed 
for finding a way out of the present situation; Russia’s strategy toward improving relations with 
the EU; formulation of an acceptable legal basis for these relations; and priorities in the 
development of Russia’s trade and economic relations with the EU.  2 | THE PRESENT SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 
 
Naturally, the workshop format did not permit the experts to make a comprehensive analysis of 
Russia-EU relations. In accordance with the scenario, the experts focused only on the most 
important issues. Other aspects of Russia-EU relations are to be discussed at a later date. 
An absolute majority of the participants in the workshop agreed that Russia must determine its 
priorities with respect to its relations with the European Union. A continuation of the present 
ambiguity and inconsistency in approaches to Russia-EU relations would be unproductive and 
even detrimental to Russia’s and Europe’s future and to their mutual relations. Russia must 
work out a strategic agenda of its own for relations with the European Union and reform the 
system of interaction with the EU. Also, Russia must define its strategic goals concerning 
interaction with the EU and its political culture. 
2.  General Analysis of the Situation: A Brief Summary of the Discussion 
2.1  Current Trends in EU Development 
The European Union is witnessing difficult and sometimes conflicting processes. On the one 
hand, the EU’s inner unity is strengthened by ever-new powers and authority vested in the 
Union’s supranational bodies in Brussels. On the other hand, the integration among the EU 
member states in foreign policy, security and defence has dim prospects. The EU’s large-scale 
enlargement has made it a loose organisation that is hard to control. There have emerged rival 
groups inside it. Outside forces (the United States) seek to play on the EU’s differences and 
prevent it from becoming a consolidated and powerful actor on the international political stage. 
Thus far, the complexity of the coordination process in Brussels has been reducing the foreign-
policy influence of powerful actors. It remains unclear whether this tendency will persist after 
the EU Constitution takes effect (if it ever does) and after the post of EU ‘foreign minister’ is 
instituted. The participants in the workshop agreed that, despite strengthening of the pan-
European element in the policies of the leading EU members, countries such as the UK, France, 
Germany or Italy are unlikely to waive their sovereign rights in some important issues in the 
foreseeable future. 
The majority of the workshop participants (80%) expressed their conviction that the European 
project is viable and that it will further develop in content and scope. The EU’s laws, rules and 
new political culture will have an ever-growing influence on adjacent territories and – in the 
long term – on all the former Soviet republics in the western part of the ex-Soviet Union. This 
factor is changing the context of almost all aspects of Russia’s foreign and home policies and 
requires adequate understanding, reaction and adaptation to the new realities. 
The nature and direction of the evolution of the European Union, its institutional structure and 
the decision-making process have immense significance for the formulation by Russia of its 
ultimate goal with regard to its relations with the EU. At present, this evolution has a 
contradictory nature, as, depending on concrete spheres and issues, it combines elements of both 
centralisation and decentralisation, strengthening its supranational nature and at the same time 
reverting the decision-making power and authority back to the member states.  
On the whole, the workshop participants agreed that the Euro-bureaucracy and some EU 
member states (smaller countries and some of the new members) are interested in deepening the 
supranational character of the integration, in enhancing the roles of the European Commission 
and the European Parliament and in centralising the decision-making process. Officially, the EU 
is following this path, but it is encountering objective difficulties provoked by the EU’s 
enlargement, which increased its loose and heterogeneous nature and is undermining the 
integration platform based on common standards and values. It is not ruled out that the present 
and future enlargement of the European Union (involving the Balkans, Turkey and Ukraine), as RUSSIA-EU RELATIONS | 3 
 
well as difficulties involved in the institutional reform and introduction of the EU Constitution, 
may cause the EU to develop according to the ‘common market plus’ formula.
2 Yet, the 
majority of the experts argued that the centralisation of the EU and the deepening of its unity 
will prevail despite the ‘developmental diseases’. 
The majority of the workshop participants agreed that a heterogeneous, rather than over-
centralised European Union would better meet Russia’s interests. However, Moscow’s ability to 
influence the EU’s evolution is almost zero. At the same time, there remains the possibility to 
look for allies – both among the EU member states and its institutions – and for forming 
‘coalitions of the willing’ to promote decisions that would be advantageous to Russia. It is 
important that such coalitions be built at stages of initial discussions in the EU, rather than when 
final decisions are made. Another major priority is the building of mechanisms for interaction 
with the EU’s central bodies –the European Commission and the Parliament. 
2.2  Russia-EU Political Relations  
Despite the long and active dialogue between Russia and the European Union, a well-developed 
system of bilateral ties at various levels and a solid legal basis, relations between Russia and the 
EU remain in a state of uncertainty. The main sign of this uncertainty is the inability of both 
parties to jointly formulate their strategic goals in their relations (and to define common values, 
interests and tasks in the area of Russia-EU cooperation). 
Above all, this concerns Russia, whose policy lacks clarity with regard to Europe. At present, 
the only clearly formulated point of Russia’s policy towards the European Union is the assertion 
that “Russia does not seek EU membership”. This can hardly be viewed as an adequate 
programme of action and as a strategic agenda. 
Representatives of both the EU and Russia emphasise the ‘special Russian mentality’, as well as 
Russia’s huge size and relative economic backwardness when speaking about the hypothetical 
impossibility of Russia integrating itself into the European Union. On the whole, these 
arguments are valid enough, yet they should not be made absolute. At the same time, several 
participants argued there are candidates for EU accession that are less developed economically 
than Russia, or have a mentality that differs significantly from the ‘European mentality’ (for 
example, Turkey). When speaking about the size of Russia as an argument against EU 
integration, this seems to lack real validity in our modern era of communications; moreover, it 
may be balanced by Russia’s rich natural resources. Besides, representatives of EU institutions 
themselves say that the territorial factor is now losing its decisive importance in the EU. 
An overwhelming majority of the experts (80%) agreed that it is reasonable to discuss Russia’s 
accession to the EU in the long term (in 15 to 20 years). Much will depend on what path the EU 
and Russia take. The EU may transform into a quasi-federation or a socio-economic union, 
whose members may share some aspects of their foreign and defence policies. Russia may 
become a stagnating and weakened authoritarian nation or a fast-developing and democracy-
bound country. Russia’s integration into a quasi-federative state would be much more difficult. 
                                                      
2 ‘Common market plus’ stands for a model of the European Union’s evolution, in which the economy 
and the social sphere will be the main area of integration. The right to make decisions on matters 
pertaining to foreign policy and security will go predominantly to the capitals of the EU member states. In 
other words, the EU will return to the pre-Maastricht model of the Common Market, while preserving 
Europe’s single currency and some additional elements. The Commission’s powers will be reduced, the 
decision-making process will be decentralised and an intergovernmental model of integration will be 
given preference over a supranational one. 4 | THE PRESENT SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 
 
Factors that cause Russia to make the ‘European choice’ include the scope of Russia-EU trade 
(which should be diversified) and, more importantly, geopolitical and cultural realities. In the 
future, not only will Russia find it difficult to successfully develop on its own, but even simple 
survival will be a problem. The regions to the south of Russia are growing increasingly 
unstable; a close union with China is hardly possible. The Euro-Atlantic zone and the EU’s zone 
of attraction cover most, if not all, of the former Soviet republics west and southwest of Russia. 
In the foreseeable future (within two to four years), Ukraine may join NATO and, in a longer 
perspective, enter into accession negotiations with the European Union. Moldova and, maybe, 
Belarus (in the event of political changes in the country) will follow suit. 
At present, the main factors that prevent Moscow and Brussels from overcoming ambiguity and 
the crisis of confidence in their mutual relations are growing differences in values between 
Russian and EU societies and, especially, their elites, Europe’s inability to start a real 
integration process with Russia, and the inefficiency of Russian bureaucracy in interacting with 
the European Union. 
Russia and the EU do not consider themselves opponents on the international stage. Both parties 
seek to find positive aspects in any situation, even in a conflicting one. At the same time, Russia 
and the EU lack a shared perception of the ‘strategic partnership’ notion, although this term has 
officially been used to describe the nature of their relations. The European Union often replaces 
this ‘partnership’ with tough and petty competition in specific economic issues. A majority of 
the participants in the workshop (75%) agreed that the EU views Russia as a potential opponent 
of the EU’s enlargement and seeks to neutralise its actions. At the same time, Russia has not 
been the main priority of the European Union, which has affected the quality of its Russia 
policy. 
In the last 18 to 24 months, both Russia and the European Union have grown disillusioned and 
even irritated with each other. The agenda of bilateral summits, together with the meaningful 
content of their drafted agreements, have come up short. Therefore the participants of the 
dialogue are seriously considering reducing the frequency of meetings at all levels in order to 
make them more meaningful. According to a majority of the workshop participants, Russia 
should work to temporarily ‘cool down’ its relations with the EU. This would protect it against 
excessive expectations and, therefore, disappointments. Also, the parties should start 
implementing joint projects of a lower level, which would help them bring the formal 
framework of their cooperation into line with the political and economic realities. 
Simultaneously, Russia should actively prepare a new political and legal base for its relations 
with the EU to replace their Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which expires in 
2007, in order not to have its role reduced to merely reacting to the EU’s proposals. 
At the same time, some of the workshop participants suggested that the present situation can be 
resolved by raising Russia-EU relations to a higher level and proclaiming more ambitious goals. 
However, this measure would be rational only if the Russian government makes a strategic 
decision on Russia’s real development along the ‘European path’. 
An overwhelming number of the participants in the workshop admitted that the personal 
relationships forged between the Russian president and the leaders of the EU’s major countries 
in 2000-2003, are beginning to lose their effectiveness. One of the reasons for that is the 
increased influence of smaller countries on the EU’s policy. Some of these countries (Austria, 
Denmark and the majority of the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe) are 
biased and traditionally critical with regard to Russia. As a result, European leaders 
sympathising with Moscow (Jacques Chirac, Gerhard Schroeder, Silvio Berlusconi) have found 
themselves in a minority; they are unable to control decision-making in the EU and their 
promises remain unfulfilled. Second, the leaders of major EU member states have to reckon 
with the influence of mass media and public opinion in their own countries, which are very RUSSIA-EU RELATIONS | 5 
 
critical about the current changes in Russia. Some of these leaders (for example, Tony Blair) are 
taken aback by Moscow’s moves on some minor practical issues. As a result, Russia has been 
having more and more setbacks in its EU policy. 
2.3  Russia-EU Trade and Economic Relations 
Today, the EU accounts for 48.6% of Russia’s foreign trade. However, an absolute majority of 
Russia’s exports to the EU include fossil-fuel energy supplies and primary processed goods. At 
the same time, Russia accounts for 7.6% of the EU’s aggregate imports and 4.4% of the EU’s 
aggregate exports. On the whole, Russia ranks fifth among the European Union’s trading 
partners (after the United States, Switzerland, China and Japan). Although this imbalance in 
trade is already restricting bilateral relations, Russia objectively requires not a smaller EU role 
in its foreign trade but a diversification of its exports and the development of trade with other 
actors, specifically by exporting its traditional goods to other regions as well. This was a 
unanimous view of the workshop participants. 
The experts paid particular attention to the transport aspect of Russia-EU cooperation. Owing to 
its unique geographical position, the Russian Federation can offer the most convenient and 
safest route between Europe and Asia and reap essential economic benefits from that. At 
present, the European Union seeks to increase its presence on Russian transit routes; this would 
include, primarily, flight routes. To this end, the European Commission insists that European 
airlines be exempted from compensatory payments for flights through the trans-Siberian 
corridor. If Brussels persuades Russia to implement such steps, this would represent a major 
precedent. Essentially, it would permit the EU countries to increase their traffic and transit 
across Russia, thus effectively sidelining Russian airlines without compensating their financial 
losses. Russia’s integration into Europe and the global economy could also be promoted by 
railroad traffic between Europe and Asia; this potential, however, has not been sufficiently 
tapped. Also, the toughening of environmental requirements will complicate projects involving 
the transportation of Russian energy resources across the Baltic Sea. 
The participants in the workshop agreed that there is a direct link between the quality of 
Russia’s economic policy at home and the state of its trade with the European Union. Therefore 
an improvement of these relations is impossible without changes in Russia, without 
modernisation of its economy and improvement of the state governance of the economy. 
The workshop participants said the structure of Russian exports to the EU corresponds to the 
real competitiveness of Russian products. Russian oil and gas exports presently serve as a kind 
of ‘airbag’ that provides a cushion against unpredictable complications in political relations. 
Yet, this is obviously not enough to further deepening of economic ties with the EU. Russia can 
broaden the range of its exports and change their structure only through the development of 
competitive goods and services inside the country. 
Meanwhile, the EU countries themselves do not display any special interest in a broader range 
of imports from Russia. In the medium term, they will most likely view this country rather as a 
source of energy resources. Stable energy supplies, along with political stability, are the main 
priorities of the today EU policy. 
Concurrently, the European Union is searching for new resource suppliers in order to secure 
itself against possible cataclysms in Russia, as well as to deny Moscow even a theoretical 
possibility of using its energy supplies as an instrument of political pressure. 
The experts agreed that the political and economic systems of Russia and the European Union 
are now incompatible. The Russian economic reforms from the very beginning proceeded under 
a strong influence of the so-called ‘Anglo-Saxon model’ and were not oriented to the EU’s 6 | THE PRESENT SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 
 
continental standards. Although the influence of European standards has been gradually 
increasing, this tendency does not prevail in the development of Russian legislation, partly 
because of the dim prospects of Russia-EU relations. In the same way that Russia has not yet 
made up its mind with regard to the ‘European choice’, similarly the European Union has not 
yet made a firm decision on its long-term policy towards Russia. 
Discussing relations with the EU in the context of Russia’s accession to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the experts disagreed on their assessment of the terms on which Russia 
and the EU signed a protocol on the completion of the negotiations, and on how this factor 
could be best used by Russia. 
A majority of the experts believe that, despite the positive significance of the protocol’s signing, 
the concessions which the EU has forced Russia to make may inflict great damage on the 
Russian economy as a whole, as well as on its individual corporations, such as Aeroflot, 
Gazprom and Russian Railroads. It also remains unclear what the balance of benefits and losses 
will be for Russia now that it has ratified the Kyoto Protocol. At the same time, an 
overwhelming majority of the workshop participants agreed that the closure of the WTO issue is 
a positive development as it has removed a major irritant from the Russian-EU agenda – if, of 
course, the European Commission does not try to ‘unseal’ it again. 
The experts agreed that there are at present no effective mechanisms or instruments for 
protecting the interests of Russian private business at the level of Russia-EU relations. Russian 
businesses, with rare exception, are not ready to make serious investments in the creation of a 
lobby. Furthermore, the present format of the relationship between business and government in 
Russia is not conducive to protecting the interests of Russian entrepreneurs abroad. 
Most of the experts agreed that the complicated relationship between business and government 
in today’s Russia is one of the main reasons for the vulnerability of Russian economic actors in 
relations with the European Union. 
This is a major reason why the Russia-EU negotiating process remains at a dead end and is non-
transparent for the Russian business community and why its interests are not duly taken into 
consideration by the Russian authorities. Another problem is that Russia consults the business 
community only at the early stage of its negotiating process with Brussels. In order to solve 
political problems, Russian officials often sacrifice the material interests of businesses – even 
large corporations with state capital. The Commission, however, acts exactly in the opposite 
way – it meticulously bargains even on minor issues in the interests of European economic 
actors. 
2.4  The Legal Base of Russia-EU Relations and the Problem of ‘Four 
Common Spaces’ 
The legal base of Russia-EU relations has become outdated; moreover, it has been inadequate 
from the very beginning. The parties fail to completely fulfil the terms of their Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA), concluded in 1994, and most of its key elements will no longer 
have any relevance after Russia joins the WTO. Furthermore, neither Russia nor the EU is 
preparing an adequate substitute for the PCA, which expires in 2007. The workshop participants 
unanimously agreed that top priority must be given to the preparation of a new ‘major’ treaty 
between Russia and the EU. RUSSIA-EU RELATIONS | 7 
 
Russia and the EU continue working on new cooperation mechanisms, known as ‘four common 
spaces’.
3 Acting by administrative inertia, Russian and EU officials are drafting a large package 
of agreements, whose fulfilment will require much time and effort from Russia. The workshop 
concluded that the two parties can reach agreement on common spaces in the economy and 
culture, including education. In the areas of internal and external security, however, serious 
differences remain. Also, the content, depth and duration of the common spaces are unclear; a 
majority of the experts (75%) described them as unpromising, at best, and dangerous, at worst. 
Russia’s participants in the negotiating process include various government agencies which fail 
to coordinate their efforts among themselves. Besides, this process practically does not involve 
Russian businesses; their participation in the coordination of Russia’s negotiating position is 
largely formal. EU officials play on this situation and push through their own decisions, 
especially in the economic field. Often these actions are aimed at gaining unilateral advantages. 
Some of the experts said the very concept of the common spaces may serve as a general 
framework for Russia-EU relations, which will be filled with specific moves and projects 
depending on circumstances. Other experts argued that this scenario may prove disadvantageous 
to Russia as, considering Moscow’s small negotiating capabilities, it would enable the EU to fill 
the agenda with its own initiatives and to block those of Russia. The experts failed to reach an 
agreement on this issue. 
However, a majority of the experts warned against signing any formal agreements on the four 
common spaces in the present format of Russia-EU relations – especially given the fact that 
Brussels knows that the Russian negotiators are pressed for time and have to conclude an 
agreement. Most likely, the ‘common spaces’ will result in idle declarations concealing the 
absence of real cooperation. Also, agreements on the ‘common spaces’ may contain provisions 
that would be disadvantageous to Russia. This is what the present line of the European 
Commission is aimed at. Either of the above variants would create additional irritations. 
The experts believe the work on the ‘common spaces’ should be continued but re-oriented to the 
preparation of a new ‘major’ treaty between Russia and the EU and agreements on individual 
projects. 
2.5  The EU’s Russia Policy 
The European Union is becoming increasingly aggressive towards Russia. Most importantly, 
this refers to the situation in the post-Soviet space and to competition for markets and economic 
channels of the future. In a way, the European Union, abiding by its goal of ‘Europeanising’ 
Russia and by its cooperationist agenda, is a tough rival of Russia in the economic field. All the 
workshop participants agreed with this statement. 
Some of the experts said that the European Union’s proposals for cooperation with Russia’s 
border areas make the EU a rival to Moscow in Russia’s inner space. The EU’s economic 
attractiveness for some Russian regions serves as the main instrument in these efforts. This is 
particularly true in the Kaliningrad Region and Russia’s northwest territories where proposals 
for joint Russian-EU funding of development projects are invariably accompanied by Brussels’s 
wish to exert direct influence on state government in Russia – often to Russia’s disadvantage. 
The EU’s new member states, which joined the Union in the spring of 2004, play a special – 
and ambiguous – role. A majority of them have taken a tough stance toward Russia; they try to 
                                                      
3 A common economic space, a common space of freedom, security and justice, a common space of 
cooperation in the field of external security, as well as a common space of research and education, 
including culture. 8 | THE PRESENT SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 
 
block pro-Russian initiatives of France, Germany or Italy inside the EU, seek a major role in 
mapping out the EU’s Russia policy and want to extend their influence in the post-Soviet space. 
At the same time, the existing trade and people-to-people contacts with the former Communist 
allies give Russia additional advantages in its relations with the European Union, and it would 
be a mistake to ignore them. The growing centralisation of decision-making in the EU causes 
discomfort to its new members, which also gives Russia some room for manoeuvre. 
The recent enlargement of the European Union has aggravated the Kaliningrad transit problem. 
All the experts participating in the workshop agreed that Russia should not expect any 
concessions from the EU with regard to the movement of Russian citizens between Russia and 
the Kaliningrad exclave. The only condition for a facilitated regime for Russians’ travel in that 
region would be the EU’s hypothetical control over the region and Russia’s de facto loss of its 
sovereignty over that territory. 
An overwhelming majority of the experts (85%) described the agreed Russian-EU ‘solution’ of 
the problem of the freedom of movement of people and goods between Kaliningrad and the rest 
of Russia as unsatisfactory and as Russia’s failure. The de facto existing format of transit is in 
no way different from a full-scale visa regime; moreover, the right to issue transit documents 
belongs to foreign states which can deny permission for transit. Freight transit rates have been 
increasing fast. 
It is also unlikely that Russia and individual EU countries will conclude bilateral agreements to 
facilitate the transit regime, which would not run counter to the Schengen Agreement, as was 
the case with similar agreements concluded by Russia with Germany and France. 
2.6  Possible Scenarios for the Development of Russia-EU Relations 
The experts were split on what scenario for the development of Russia-EU relations after 2005-
2007 would be more advantageous to Russia. 
The larger part of the experts (65%) believes that Russia would gain from a technical pause (not 
a freeze) in its relations with the European Union. This pause could be used to rethink and mend 
negative aspects of the present format of relations, prepare a more stable platform for the future 
and implement specific projects. 
A pause is needed because the Russian economy and businesses are unprepared for closer 
relations with the EU. The Russian business community and even the government lack enough 
knowledge about EU mechanisms, while the Russian state does not defend domestic businesses 
from the pressure of rival companies and bureaucracy of the European Union. As a result, 
Russian corporations incur direct losses and can lose major markets for their goods and services. 
Some of the experts favour a more active dialogue with the EU, fearing that a pause may evolve 
into a decline. At the same time, an overwhelming majority of the experts warned against an 
early conclusion of an agreement on ‘four common spaces’. According to the poll, however, this 
majority is not overwhelming (60%). 
2.7 The Level and quality of Russia’s governmental structures 
Knowledge about the European Union 
The experts concluded that Russia’s administrative machinery is not prepared for the tasks set 
down by its EU policy. The structures that are responsible for interaction with the European 
Union are organisationally disunited, and the number of qualified personnel is insufficient to 
effectively work with the powerful bureaucratic machinery of Brussels. RUSSIA-EU RELATIONS | 9 
 
Individual Russian agencies specialise in their narrow areas of cooperation with the EU and 
interact with their counterparts in European Commission subdivisions and other EU bodies 
without sound coordination of their efforts between themselves. In contrast, the individual 
agencies and departments of the European Union are highly coordinated. 
Russia’s society, political establishment and bureaucracy lack adequate knowledge of how the 
European Union operates. The number of people in Russia who are well informed about the 
inner workings of the European Union is very small (estimated in tens), and over the past few 
years their numbers have not increased. The growth in the number of qualified personnel in the 
1990s has been offset by their peers leaving for the sphere of business where they do not use 
this knowledge at all or cannot use it in full. As a result, Commission officials take the drafting 
and decision-making processes under their control. Russia often lacks the people and time to 
prepare its own drafts for joint documents. 
The representation of Russian business interests in Brussels is extremely weak or practically 
non-existent, and only a few Russian companies have lobbyists and legal staff there. The 
increase in the number of Russia’s permanent representation to the European Union has been a 
positive move, yet the lobbying staff remains obviously insufficient. 
3.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
3.1 Russia’s Long-Term Strategy towards the EU and European 
Integration 
The participants of the workshop unanimously agreed that the main problem of Russia’s EU 
policy is the absence of a strategic vision concerning Russia’s place in the pan-European 
context. 
The main conclusion and recommendation of the experts was as follows: Russia’s political class 
and society must choose a model for the country’s development and define a strategic goal for 
its relations with the EU. 
The experts argue there are only two possible models: 
1)  Russia’s strategic integration with the EU which may result in its eventual accession to a 
new European Union; or 
2)  cooperation between two independent centres of power (each belonging to the community 
of developed democratic nations) that does not imply elements of formal integration, such 
as harmonisation of respective legislations, etc. (The community of developed nations can 
be defined as a ‘democratic community’, ‘Euro-Atlantic community’, or the ‘world centre’, 
etc.) 
The experts did not discuss a model that Russia-EU relations may assume if Russia takes the 
path of stagnation, political degradation and disintegration. 
The experts emphasised that, when choosing between the two variants, one must take into 
consideration that, if the present tendencies persist, including in Russia’s internal development, 
most (if not all) of the former Soviet republics in the western part of the ex-Soviet Union will 
integrate into the Euro-Atlantic military and political system within the next few years and will 
seek EU membership. 
An overwhelming majority of the experts concluded that the process of the European Union’s 
continuing extension into the post-Soviet space cannot be stopped and should be viewed as an 
objective reality. In the future, the civilisational, military, political and economic divide may lie 
along the boundaries of Russia’s western areas. It must also be taken into account that a 10 | THE PRESENT SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 
 
European Union of 2015 or, especially, 2030 will differ greatly, if not essentially, from the 
present Union. Russia must orient itself to the future, not present, EU. 
3.2  The More Acceptable Scenario for the Development of Russia’s 
Relations with the EU 
An overwhelming majority of the workshop participants agreed that maintaining the status quo 
in Russian-European relations – preserving the present model of cooperation and trying to 
overcome the latent crisis by letting things run their natural course – would be unacceptable. 
The experts disagreed over what scenario for the further development would be advantageous to 
Russia. They agreed, however, that the choice of a specific model of interaction (a decision not 
to integrate into the EU; a decrease in the level and format of Russia-EU relations; or an 
upgrade to a higher level of integration) will depend on Russia’s strategic goal. If Russia builds 
its relations with the EU without having such a goal in mind, it will have to make ever-new 
unilateral concessions and its role will be reduced to merely reacting to the EU’s proposals. 
Considering the possibility of the EU evolving toward a ‘common market plus’ model (instead 
of a quasi-federative state) and the interests of Russia’s modernisation, and provided Russia 
identifies itself as a European state, some of the experts recommended raising (theoretically) the 
issue of EU membership for Russia, thus elevating Russia-EU relations to a higher level of 
integration. They also proposed that Moscow enter into negotiations with Brussels for the 
replacement of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with an Association Agreement. 
There are several reasons for this proposal. First, Russia is economically dependent on the 
European Union. Second, among Russia’s foreign-policy partners and neighbours, the European 
Union is the most predictable, civilised and attractive. Third, Russia’s acute demographic crisis, 
together with its increasing lag behind the advanced countries in terms of technological 
progress, will inevitably reduce its role as an independent global centre of power. Therefore, 
according to some of the experts, Russia’s most rational, pragmatic and successful decision 
would be to end its unrealistic claims of being an absolutely independent ‘pole’ and assume a 
steady rapprochement with the European Union. 
However, a majority of the experts who share the view that the most advantageous policy for 
Russia would be to nurture its relations with the EU, believe that drafting a Treaty of 
Association at this point in time would be premature. Russia should waive the present format of 
its relations with the EU and proceed to deeper integration in two stages. 
Russia-EU relations have been hit by a crisis of confidence and systemic differences, which 
prevents raising these relations to a higher integration level at once. Besides, such a decision 
would be ineffective considering the peculiarities of the present political regime in Russia, as 
well as the need for the European Union to ‘digest’ its 10 new members (plus Bulgaria and 
Romania) and to carry out an institutional reform. Now when the EU’s Russia policy is aimed at 
wresting economic and political concessions from Russia and at extending European (not 
international) legislation to Russian soil, attempts to raise the issue of upgrading Russia-EU 
relations would not be taken seriously and may result in increased pressure from Brussels. 
Therefore, as an intermediate measure, Russia could revise its relations with the EU, removing 
any elements that does not meet Russia’s objective interests. 
First, any reference to integration must be temporarily removed from Russia-EU relations, in 
particular those references that demand the extrapolation of EU legislation to Russian soil. 
Russia’s priority must be its adaptation to international, as opposed to European, legislation 
through accession to the World Trade Organisation. Once Russia’s legal norms are brought into RUSSIA-EU RELATIONS | 11 
 
line with international standards, Russia will be able to bring its relations with the EU to a 
higher integration level. 
Second, Russia and the EU should draft and sign a new treaty that would provide for close 
economic and political relations between the two mutually independent economic and political 
actors on the world stage. 
Third, relations with the European Union, which now dominate Russia’s foreign policy agenda, 
should be temporarily given a less significant place in the hierarchy of Russia’s foreign-policy 
priorities. The experts believe this move will help Russia and the European Union to achieve a 
higher level of integration in the future, as they will proceed not from the present negative state 
of affairs in their mutual relations but from a relatively clean sheet. Besides, it will be in line 
with the EU’s rhetoric with regard to Russia, which Brussels describes as its ‘strategic partner’ 
along with the United States, Japan, China and India. 
Some of the workshop participants insisted that lessening the significance of Russia-EU 
relations, together with the removal of integration references, must mark a final, rather than 
intermediate format and model of these relations. These experts argued that proceeding to a 
higher level of integration would make sense only if it results in full-scale EU membership, 
whereas intermediate stages would actually repeat the present format of Russia-EU relations, 
with its shortcomings. Following their logic, full-scale EU membership (even if it evolves into a 
‘common market plus’ model) would damage the long-term interests of Russia as a global 
player. Besides, Russia and the EU are rivals in some areas of global politics, such as the future 
of the post-Soviet space and relations with the United States. Finally, Russia’s mentality and 
political culture prevent it from accepting the idea of becoming ‘one of numerous leaders’ inside 
the European Union. 
However, the experts expressing this point of view were in the minority; the majority of the 
experts believe that in the medium term and, particularly, in the long term, Russia will not be 
able to handle the task of becoming an independent centre of power in the global system, while 
siding with other centres of power (for example, China) would be either unrealistic or simply 
dangerous. 
A ‘Russian Model’ of Relations with the EU 
The experts unanimously concluded that none of the present models of the EU’s relations with 
external partners (EU-US, ‘New Neighbourhood’, ‘Swiss’ or ‘Norwegian’ model, etc.) can be 
fully borrowed by Russia. Each of these models is based on a unique historical, economic, 
political and cultural platform and cannot mechanically be applied to Russia. 
Of the various models of relations which the EU builds with its external partners, the least 
advantageous for Russia would be ‘integration without membership’. Such a model (used, for 
example, in the EU-Norway relations) would provide for the harmonisation of Russian and EU 
legislation, but would deny Russia the right to participate in the drafting process of EU 
legislation. The ‘Swiss’ model may be somewhat more acceptable, as it provides for borrowing 
only those EU norms and standards that the recipient country finds advantageous. 
The participants in the workshop recommended studying thoroughly all existing models and 
borrowing only those that would meet Russia’s interests. The same relates to EU legislation – 
only those elements that are advantageous for Russia can be transferred onto Russian soil, 
including both those advantageous in themselves, and those advantageous for the development 
of relations with the EU. 
An overwhelming majority of the experts agreed that any integration efforts on the part of 
Russia with regard to the EU will be successful only if it seeks to adopt a model of democracy 12 | THE PRESENT SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 
 
that would be similar to that of the EU. But given the conditions of the present situation, when 
the elites of Russia and the European Union have different values and views, attempts to borrow 
individual elements of integration can only serve to aggravate the negative atmosphere. 
The experts unanimously agreed that the main criterion for choosing positive elements of other 
models of the EU’s relations with external partners must be clarity with the final goal of Russia-
EU relations – membership in the EU or intensive cooperation between two different actors. 
The experts believe that, when choosing advantageous elements of cooperation with the EU, 
Moscow must take into account objective and subjective limitations imposed on the possible 
format of Russia-EU relations by the nature of the European Union and the logic of its 
functioning and interaction with external partners. When building a ‘Russian model’, Moscow 
must not only be guided by what is advantageous to it, but also by what the EU will really 
permit. 
These limitations are as follows: 
•  the internal agenda of the European Union, which implies the need to adapt its new 10 
members (plus Bulgaria and Romania); 
•  the European Union’s constant striving to enforce its own legislation and standards on third 
countries as a condition for cooperation; and 
•  the integrationist nature of the EU, which does not allow it to depart from the set of 
common standards and rules for fear of its own disintegration. 
Russia can soften the effect of these limiting factors if it adapts to international (not European) 
legislation and standards in the economic, judicial and other spheres first. 
3.3  The Legal Base of Russia-EU Relations and the ‘Four Common 
Spaces’ 
The experts concluded that the concept of ‘four common spaces’ cannot be viewed as an 
adequate replacement for the Russia-EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1994. At 
the same time, there is a serious threat that these ‘spaces’, rather than a new treaty, will serve as 
the basis of Russia-EU relations in the future. From a legal point of view, the concept of ‘four 
common spaces’ is beyond the juridical conceptual vocabulary. From the point of view of 
political relations, the content of Russia’s and the European Union’s joint ‘road maps’ does not 
bring Moscow any serious additional dividends. 
Therefore, a majority of the experts proposed that official Russian bodies should not hurry with 
the drafting of joint Russia-EU documents on the ‘common spaces’. They agreed that the main 
driving force behind the continued efforts in this field is the administrative and negotiating 
inertia on both parts, as well as the fear that a pause in the dialogue would increase the 
atmosphere of mutual mistrust. There are serious apprehensions that introducing additional 
irritating factors into Russia-EU relations would threaten the impermissibly small positive 
agenda of the parties. 
A majority of the experts (80%) believe that the incompletion of the work on joint documents 
concerning the ‘four common spaces’ would not be an obstacle to continued cooperation with 
the European Union in individual areas or for the conclusion of a new major treaty with the EU. 
Moreover, the work on the ‘four spaces’ would only create a false impression of progress in 
bilateral relations and would thus undermine stimuli for creating and implementing specific 
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In the opinion of an overwhelming majority of the experts, Russia should refrain from signing 
any binding agreements with the European Union for the next two to three years. Russia should 
explain to its European partners that, given the present circumstances and taking into 
consideration the need to draft a new Russia-EU treaty, the parties should not hurry to conclude 
individual agreements – and even less so a ‘package’ of documents – on the ‘four spaces’. 
Besides, the European Commission will, most likely, try to fix Moscow’s unilateral concessions 
through formal agreements. If, however, Russia does decide to sign documents with the EU, 
these should be limited to ‘agreements on strategic intent’. Further concessions would hit 
Russian society with the ‘Gorbachev-Kozyrev syndrome’ of the late 1980s-early 1990s when 
Moscow’s ‘at-your-service’ policy towards the West engendered resentment within the society. 
This resentment is still complicating development of constructive Russia-West relations. 
The negotiations on the ‘common spaces’ should be re-directed towards the preparation of a 
new ‘major’ treaty between Russia and the EU, which must replace the 1994 PCA. Already now 
Russia should build an internal mechanism to draft its own variant of a new fundamental 
document. 
This is particularly important as it will help increase Moscow’s initiative in its contacts with the 
European Union; until now, Moscow has only reacted to Commission-prepared projects. Russia 
should draft and propose its own variant of a new ‘major’ treaty with the EU for the period after 
2007, as well as drafts of agreements on individual areas of cooperation and specific projects. 
The experts repeatedly emphasised that the content and nature of a new treaty must be 
determined not by the need for ‘rapprochement’ or as a result of administrative inertia, but by 
Russia’s final goal in its relations with the EU. The formulation of a clear goal must precede the 
drafting of the treaty, and not vice versa. Russia’s goal with regard to the EU will determine 
whether the new treaty will be, say, a Treaty of Association or a less significant agreement that 
will not provide for any serious integration. 
3.4  Russia’s Trade and Economic Relations with the EU and Russia’s 
Accession to the WTO 
A majority of the experts agreed that Russia should diversify its exports and seek new markets. 
The growth of Russia’s aggregate exports must not depend solely on the situation in the EU 
market, which is already saturated with goods and services. At the same time, the EU is the 
most probable source of foreign direct investment in the Russian economy, which is required to 
develop new industries, improve ecological and technological culture and enter promising 
export markets. 
Russia can increase its competitiveness by developing a transcontinental transport 
infrastructure. In this respect, Russia must revise its approach to transportation issues, which are 
now linked to the problems of national security only. The construction of new railroads, air 
navigation and air traffic control systems and the modernisation of existing ones, the 
construction of modern transit airports and the preservation of compensatory payments for non-
stop flights along the promising trans-Siberian route are important steps in this direction. 
Some of the experts recommended considering the ecological aspect of Russia’s trade with the 
EU. In the near future, environmental protection requirements will become a mighty weapon in 
the hands of the European Union, and Russia must be ready for that. It must forestall possible 
accusations against itself of ecological/social dumping. 
Russia should take advantage of the completion of the WTO negotiations to address specific 
problems, such as relations in the post-Soviet space; the Kaliningrad issue; the drafting of a new 
Russia-EU treaty; and the future of the concept of ‘four common spaces’. Earlier, the need to 14 | THE PRESENT SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 
 
sign the WTO protocol forced Russia to make concessions to the EU which occasionally linked 
one issue or another to the WTO accession issue. Now that this ‘sword of Damocles’ has been 
removed, Russian negotiators have gained more freedom of action. Besides, if the negotiations 
on the ‘common spaces’ are re-directed into the context of the preparation of a new Russia-EU 
treaty, the new agenda will have to be filled with specific projects instead of mere declarations. 
3.5  Addressing Problems Associated with the Kaliningrad Issue 
According to an overwhelming majority of the experts (95%), the solution of the problem of 
transit and free travel between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia is impossible without solving 
the problem of free travel between Russia and the European Union as a whole. The conclusion 
of a special treaty that would make special exceptions to the Schengen Agreement and abolish 
transit visa is ruled out. 
3.6  Improving the Performance of Russian Official Bodies Interacting 
with the EU 
In the unanimous opinion of the workshop participants, Russian official bodies engaged in 
routine interaction with the EU need to seriously improve the quality of their work. This can be 
done by increasing their personnel and funds, improving the personnel’s professional skills, 
implementing structural changes and better coordinating Russia’s EU policy. 
Several experts proposed consolidating negotiation resources in one of the existing agencies or 
– in the long term – within the framework of a special agency on EU affairs. This move would 
help remove many of the problems caused by the lack of coordination of Russia’s position. 
Also, it would deny the Commission the possibility to push through its own decisions due to the 
lack of coordination among various Russian agencies. 
The experts proposed that Russia’s Foreign Ministry should act as the coordinating agency for 
the transition period; this ministry boasts highly skilled negotiators and has rich experience in 
conducting multilateral negotiations. At the same time, other Russian ministries that are now 
engaged in dialogue with the EU must play their roles too. Their representatives must be 
involved in the coordination of positions within the framework of interdepartmental committees 
and in ad hoc working groups. 
The establishment of ad hoc working groups was mentioned as a possible intermediate form of 
interaction. The experts spoke highly of the US experience in this field, which implies strict 
subordination of such a group to a higher governmental official with a sufficient scope of 
powers. The experts expressed doubts, however, that this system would work in Russia, given 
the present lack of efficiency and problematic administrative culture of the state apparatus. 
If none of the existing government agencies is assigned the role of coordinator with the EU, 
priority must be given to the establishment of a special agency that would coordinate efforts to 
work out and advance a single Russian position on all aspects of relations with the European 
Union. This agency should actively pool the expertise of the Russian expert community. In 
particular, the experts put forward the idea of creating a broad public Council on Russia-EU 
relations, which would assess their current relationship and propose new initiatives for 
furthering rapprochement with the European Union. 
Taking into account the increasing role of the European Parliament, it is important that Russia 
strengthen ties with it at the level of inter-parliamentary structures, public organisations and 
business associations. It is time for Russia to go beyond the framework of the existing inter-
parliamentary dialogue and proceed to direct representation of Russian interests in the European RUSSIA-EU RELATIONS | 15 
 
Parliament. The experts also proposed establishing ad hoc committees (subcommittees) on 
Russia-EU relations at Russia’s Federal Assembly, as is done in many other countries. 
Considering the acute shortage of specialists in EU affairs, which threatens the key interests of 
Russia and its national security, the experts spoke in favour of introducing special bonuses to 
encourage such specialists to work for government agencies. 
On the whole, the experts expressed their dissatisfaction with the existing system of managing 
relations with the EU but failed to reach agreement on ways to improve this situation. The 
experts pointed out differences among government agencies. 
3.7  Increasing the Role of Private Businesses 
The participants in the workshop unanimously favoured strengthening the participation of 
Russia’s business circles in implementing practical moves with regard to the European Union 
and in protecting Russia’s economic interests in Brussels. To this end, clear-cut ‘rules of the 
game’ (distribution of powers) must be established in cooperation between Russian official 
bodies and private businesses. 
New modern mechanisms for advancing Russia’s economic interests in relations with the EU 
must be created on the basis of coordination and mutual support of private and state structures. 
This can be achieved through more active interaction of the business community with Russia’s 
official representation at the European Union, more active involvement of EU legal structures, 
and creation of its own infrastructure for influencing the decision-making process in the 
European Union. Also, Russian businesses and government agencies must use the Russian 
expert community in this field on a larger scale and promote its consolidation. To this end, the 
workshop participants proposed that Russian businesses invest in efforts to improve knowledge 
about the European Union in Russia. 
The Russian business community must intensify efforts to establish its representation with a 
powerful analytical and legal potential in Brussels. Also, requests for analytical research should 
be submitted to Russian scientific and educational centres that still have groups of specialists in 
EU affairs. 
3.8  Improving the Knowledge about the EU 
The participants in the workshop unanimously agreed that Russia must urgently adopt a state 
programme for studying the European Union. Emphasis in these efforts must be placed not on 
purely theoretical studies, as is done in Russian academic institutes or institutions of higher 
education (the description of the European Union’s institutions and its history), but on the study 
of all practical EU mechanisms – most importantly, European law – and on the training of 
experts in EU affairs, both in Russia and abroad. Applied knowledge of this kind will help 
Russian representatives to defend and promote Russia’s interests and positions in a competent 
way. 
The experts supported the idea of establishing a European College at the Moscow State Institute 
of International Relations, but agreed that this proposal is insufficient for achieving the above 
goals. More important is the mass education of Russian students and young specialists at 
European colleges and universities, as well as the establishment of specialised courses in 
Russia, involving Russian professors. The programme of training young specialists in EU 
affairs could become the subject of a special agreement with the European Union. Russia and 
the EU might jointly allocate funds for this purpose. 16 | THE PRESENT SITUATION AND PROSPECTS 
 
In the opinion of all the participants in the workshop, training of Russian specialists at 
educational institutions and government agencies of the European Union would provide them 
with unique knowledge and experience. It would give them an opportunity to understand how it 
feels to be in the shoes of a European bureaucrat, while enabling them to establish personal 
contacts with officials of the European Commission and other European institutions. Besides, it 
would help establish network ties between young Russian elites and elites of other European 
countries. 
Public and civil society organisations that are establishing personal, professional and political 
ties with Europe are to be resolutely encouraged and supported. 
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Stratagen  mission statement 
•  To define a vision for a Wider European order and the relationship between the enlarged EU 
and its Arab/Muslim neighbourhood; 
•  To develop these proposals in-depth and in policy-operational terms;  
•  To combine in-house research capacity with networks of individuals from leading research 
institutes in the EU and the neighbourhood, and to disseminate and advocate proposals 
throughout the region; 
•  To work independently from the EU institutions but in close interaction with them; and 
•  To decide on the sequencing and selection of priority topics with core stakeholders. 
Over the last five years, CEPS has developed an exceptional expertise in European Union policies 
in the area often called the Wider Europe. This has been reflected in publications that have been 
both regional and thematic: CEPS Plan for the Balkans (1999), Stability Pact for the Caucasus
(2000), The Elephant and the Bear – EU, Russia and their Near Abroads (2001), Cyprus as 
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available from the CEPS’ on-line bookshop, at http://shop.ceps.be 
CEPS has decided to build on and strengthen its work in this broad area through the Stratagen
programme over the five-year period 2005-2010. The rationale for this initiative follows from 
both the EU’s historic enlargement on 1 May 2004, which now leads the EU to define a new 
neighbourhood policy, and the unprecedented turmoil in the Middle East in the aftermath of 
September 11
th and the Iraq war, with its consequences for transatlantic relations. 
The Stratagen programme will be organised under the following broad geographic areas: 
•  Northern neighbourhood policy, covering CIS states targeted by EU neighbourhood policy 
•  EU-Russian relations 
•  Southern neighbourhood policy, covering Mediterranean states, but reaching also into what is 
now officially called the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) 
•  Implications for transatlantic relations will be considered for all three regions above. 
The analytical methodology will be multi-disciplinary: political science, international relations 
and European studies, economics and law.   
The programme is led by Michael Emerson, CEPS Senior Research Fellow, together with Daniel 
Gros, CEPS Director. CEPS gratefully acknowledges financial support for the  Stratagen
programme from the Open Society Institute and the Compagnia di San Paolo.  
C  E 
P  S 
 
CENTRE FOR
EUROPEAN 
POLICY 
STUDIES 
Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels 
Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ Fax: (32.2) 219.41.51 
www.ceps.be ▪ info@ceps.be 
 
W
e
b
s
i
t
e
:
 
w
w
w
.
c
e
p
s
.
b
e
 
 
 
 
B
o
o
k
s
h
o
p
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
s
h
o
p
.
c
e
p
s
.
b
e
 
 
 
 
 
About CEPS 
Founded in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research 
institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from 
official institutions (European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and 
national bodies), foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales. 
Goals 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of 
Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public
events. 
Assets and Achievements 
•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence. 
•  Authoritative research by an international staff with a demonstrated capability to analyse policy 
questions and anticipate trends well before they become topics of general public discussion. 
•  Formation of seven different research networks, comprising some 140 research institutes from 
throughout Europe and beyond, to complement and consolidate our research expertise and to 
greatly extend our reach in a wide range of areas from agricultural and security policy to 
climate change, JHA and economic analysis. 
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with 
extensive working experience in EU affairs. 
Programme Structure 
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems 
and opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its 
publications and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research 
programme is organised under two major headings: 
Economic Policy  Politics, Institutions and Security 
Macroeconomic Policy  The Future of Europe 
European Network of Economic Policy  Justice and Home Affairs 
    Research Institutes (ENEPRI)  The Wider Europe 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS Annual Conference) and internet and media 
relations. 